Nothing epitomises this more than the agreement relating to textiles. From the point of view of the developing countries, the most visible and "multilaterally" accepted non-tariff barrier arrangement prior to the Uruguay Round was the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. That arrangement was the end-result of a series of negotiated agreements starting in the 1960s, all of which sought to provide the developed countries with the time needed to restructure their industries so that competitive textile exports from lower-cost developing countries do not "disrupt" their markets. Despite three decades of agreement on that principle and periodic revisions of the deadline for ending import restrictions, textiles still were by the late-1980s not permitted free entry in developed-country markets. The case for an immediate end to such restrictions, under a new multilateral trade regime was therefore strong. However, though the Uruguay Round agreement on textiles and clothing provided for the phasing out of restraints stemming from the Multi-fibre Arrangement, it once again delayed the process of liberalisation. The process was designed to occur in four stages over a ten-year period and is heavily "back-loaded", in the sense that most of the liberalisation occurs during the last stages. The four stages defined involve the following:

• In the first stage, beginning on the date on which the Uruguay Round became effective, each signatory nation was required to remove quotas only on products that account for 16 per cent of its total volume of imports of four categories of textiles and clothing in 1990 (tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textiles products and clothing);

• In the second stage, beginning three years and one month after the agreement came into force, quotas were to be removed on a further 17 per cent of the total volume of 1990 imports; In the third stage, which begins four years later, quotas are to be removed on products that account for not less than 18 per cent of the total volume of 1990 imports;

• Finally, after 10 years and one month, all other quota restrictions are to be eliminated.

This prolonged and back-loaded agreement in a labour-intensive area in which the developed countries had agreed to open up markets more than three decades back, points both to the relative positions of power of developed and developing countries in the Uruguay Round negotiations as well as to the extent of commitment of the latter to offer greater market access as a quid pro quo for the rapid liberalisation of trade and investment rules in the developing countries. What is more revealing is the evidence on the progress on this front. With two stages of the phase out process being complete, 33 per cent of imports by volume of four categories of textiles and clothing are ostensibly outside any quota regime.
Chart 8 >> Chart 9 >>
 
However, out of the quotas under MFA notified by the US, EU and Canada (Chart 8), after the completion of the second stage of implementation of the MFA phase out, only 1, 7 and 14 per cent respectively (Chart 9) have been withdrawn. Much of the phase out thus far covered commodities which were not even in consideration. Further, most of these are textile products which do not dominate the developing countries' export basket. Above all, as Charts 11 and 12 indicate, the extent of tariff concessions, both in terms of tariff reduction and the share of the relevant imports subject to cuts, provided by the developing countries have been higher than that provided by the developed in industrial products in general and in the textile area in particular. That is, five years after the completion of the Round and at a time when talk is already on with regard to initiating a new round, developing-country, market-access "gains" in an area most crucial to them have been minimal.
Chart 11 >> Chart 12 >>
 
The implication of this is obvious enough. Even in an area as basic as market access, what is called for now is a review of the Uruguay Round aimed at redressing the inequalities it carried through in its fine print rather than an extension of the Round either in the form of more intensive liberalisation or in the form of extending the multilateral framework into new areas. However, neither the outcome of the Uruguay Round nor the current discussion is influenced by the interests of the developing countries. The perception that the Marrakech agreement of 1994 constituted a qualitative advance sprang from many sources. To start with, it created a formal international institutional framework in the form of the World Trade Organisation, to oversee the implementation of the terms of the agreement. This was expected to correct the inadequacy that there was no formal institutional framework governing world trade, especially because the agreement included clauses aimed at strengthening dispute settlement mechanisms and disciplinary norms regarding the use of safeguard measures like anti-dumping and countervailing duties which can be used to sidestep uncomfortable trade liberalisation policies.