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Bank Credit: A Reassertion of Priorities? |
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| Oct
14th 2005, C.P. Chandrasekhar |
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Democracy yields many dividends. Important among them
is the pressure on governments, however neo-liberal
in inclination, to pay heed to sentiments that can determine
political legitimacy and make a difference to electoral
outcomes. Over the last year, it has been obvious that
the economic decision-makers within the UPA government
have a strong preference for neo-liberal policies. Yet,
they have had to accept, even if with much reticence
and hesitation, that markets are often prone to fail,
necessitating intervention by the state. Among the few
areas where such good sense appears to now prevail is
the direction of credit to priority sectors.
A draft Technical Paper prepared by an internal working
group of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has recommended
correcting the dilution of priority sector credit provision.
The constitution of the working group was triggered
by a December 2004 decision to revitalise priority sector
credit, which was followed by a reference in the Annual
Policy Statement of the Reserve Bank of India to a view
that enlargement of areas eligible for priority sector
lending had resulted in a loss of focus and that ''credit
growth in housing, venture capital and infrastructure
has been strong while it has been sluggish in agriculture
and small industries.'' The working group's mandate
therefore was to revisit the need for priority sector
lending and assess the demand for course correction
in the implementation of the programme.
Since the mid-1960s, credit has been seen as an important
instrument of development policy in India. The agrarian
crisis of 1964-66, the industrial deceleration and overall
economic stagnation that followed and the political
instabilities these generated, brought home the point
that crucial institutional constraints to growth had
not been addressed during the early planning years.
This had not only resulted in a development impasse,
but necessitated attention to the deep inequities that
characterised whatever development that had occurred.
Though this realisation did not trigger any fundamental
institutional reform, such as the redistribution of
land, it ensured the adoption of at least some much-needed
policy initiatives, among which was a programme of priority
sector lending. It was clear by then that India's then
predominantly privately owned banking system was not
geared to or interested in delivering credit to a range
of sectors outside of large industry. Influenced by
the fact that credit was an important component of the
Green Revolution ''package'' aimed at stimulating agricultural
growth, and confronted by the sectoral and unit-wise
concentration of credit delivery, a decision was taken
in 1967-68 to consciously direct credit to priority
sectors such as agriculture, small-scale industry and
exports.
After 1969, when 14 major commercial banks were nationalised,
the government went much further in this direction.
In the event, the priority sector was defined to include
Agriculture, Small Scale Industry, Small Road and Water
Transport Operators, Retail Trade, Small Business, Professional
and Self Employed Persons, State sponsored schemes for
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, Education, Housing
and Consumption.
However, among these sectors the emphasis was to be
on agriculture, small industry and small business. At
present, the programme requires that priority sector
advances should constitute 40 per cent of net bank credit
(NBC) of domestic banks. The sub-target for the agricultural
sector stands at 18 per cent of total advances. Further,
60 per cent of advances to the small scale sector are
expected to be directed to the tiny sector. And, 10
per cent of net bank credit has to be directed towards
weaker sections. (The requirement set for foreign banks
was lower—at 32 per cent—and the sectoral composition
too was more lenient.)
However, over the last decade, financial liberalisation
has been diluting the directed credit programme, partly
by redefining the priority sector or providing alternatives
such as Rural Infrastructure Development Fund (RIDF)
bonds as a substitute for priority sector lending. Moreover,
special targets for the principal priority areas have
been missed. Thus, during the period 2001-04, the total
outstanding credit to the agricultural sector extended
even by public sector banks was within the range of
15-16 per cent of NBC as against the target of 18.0
per. Though in respect of private sector banks, the
ratio of agricultural credit to NBC increased from 7.1
per cent to 11.8 per cent, it still was below target.
Further with banks allowed to lend to seed and input
supplying companies or invest in RIDF bonds, the share
of direct finance to agriculture in total agricultural
credit declined from 88.2 per cent in 1995 to 71.3 percent
in 2004. The share of credit for distribution of fertilizers
and other inputs which was at 2.2 per cent in 1995 increased
to 4.2 per cent in 2004 and the share of other types
of indirect finance from 4.8 per cent to 21.0 per cent.
Further, credit to the SSI sector as a percentage of
NBC declined from 13.8 per cent to 8.2 per cent. Much
of this credit went to larger SSI units, as suggested
by the fact that the number of SSI accounts availing
of banking finance declined from 29.6 lakh to 18.1 lakh.
The most disconcerting trend was the sharp rise in the
role of the ''other priority sector'' in total priority
sector lending. This sector includes: loans up to Rs.
15 lakh in rural/ semi-urban areas, urban and metropolitan
areas for construction of houses by individuals; investment
by banks in mortgage backed securities, provided they
satisfy conditions such as their being pooled assets
in respect of direct housing loans that are eligible
for priority sector lending or are securitised loans
originated by the housing finance companies/banks; and
loans to software units with credit limit up to Rs.
1 crore. Not surprisingly, the ratio of ''other priority
sector'' lending to net bank credit rose from 7.4 per
cent in 1995 to 17.4 per cent in 2005.
All this occurred even though the priority sector was
by no means principally responsible for non performing
assets (NPAs) in the banking system. NPAs under the
priority sector accounted for 47.5 per cent of total
NPAs in 2004. Even though, this was slightly higher
than the share of the sector in total advances (44 per
cent) it was by no means disturbingly disproportionate,
given the presumption that these were ''weaker'' sectors
eligible for cross-subsidisation.
In the circumstances, the RBI's decision to correct
course, especially given signs of agrarian distress
and rising SSI mortality, seems natural. Yet, for the
RBI, the constitution of the working group and its decision
to recommend persisting with and strengthening the priority
sector lending programme is indeed a major step forward.
Financial liberalisation, which the central bank spearheads
in tandem with the Ministry of Finance, seeks to refashion
India's financial structure in directions that require
the dismantling of priority sector lending. In 1991,
the early days of unthinking ''reform'', the Narasimham
Committee on the Financial System had argued that, though
directed credit programmes had extended the reach of
the banking system to cover sectors that had earlier
been neglected, the use of the banking system to support
priority sectors and weaker sections was fundamentally
misplaced. That objective the Committee felt should
the remit of the fiscal rather than the credit system.
It, therefore, recommended that directed credit programmes
should be phased out. At most, 10 per cent of aggregate
credit, as opposed to the prevailing norm of 40 per
cent, could be directed, and targeted at a priority
sector redefined to include only small and marginal
farmers, the tiny sector of industry, small business
and transport operators, village and cottage industries,
rural artisans and other weaker sections.
Given the evidence that some of these were the sectors
which received the lowest share of priority lending
even during the heydays of directed lending, such targeting
was a prescription for dismantling the system. That
was understandable within the Narasimham framework,
which saw directed credit as unjustified. But ground
realities prevented the implementation of the Narasimham
recommendations. And changed economic and political
conditions have now forced the RBI to revisit the implementation
of the programme.
In fact, the working group starts by once again posing
the question as to whether such credit is needed at
all. Thankfully, its answer is yes. But given the predilections
of the central bank, the justification provided for
that answer is weak and even contrary. There are two
levels at which the justification can rest. The first
is on grounds of equity alone. All sectors must get
a fair share of credit, however 'fair' be defined. It
is clearly on this ground that the working group advances
its case for persisting with directed credit. To quote
the working group's draft report: ''Even after 36 years
of priority sector lending prescriptions, it is observed
that certain important sectors in the economy continue
to suffer from inadequate credit flow…. As such, the
need for having priority sector prescriptions continues
to exist.''
While equity is indeed a valid objective in itself,
the second and more important reason why priority sectors
are delineated and supported with directed credit (sometimes
even at lower interest rates) is that credit concentration
is inimical to balanced development, which in the medium
term keeps overall growth below its potential. It could
either result in inadequate supplies in sectors crucial
to development, that hold back the expansion of the
more ''dynamic'' ones; it could limit the expansion
of incomes and the market and therefore of production.
For example, because of differentials in profitability,
the allocation of investment may not be in keeping with
that required to ensure a certain profile of the pattern
of production, needed to raise the rate of saving and
investment as emphasised in India by the Mahalanobis
model. An obvious way in which this happens is through
inadequate investments in the infrastructural sector
characterised most often by lumpy investments, long
gestation lags, higher risk and lower profit. Given
the ''external benefits'' associated with such industries,
inadequate investments in infrastructure would obviously
constrain the rate of growth. Overall, the private-profit
driven allocation of credit for investment could aggravate
the inherent tendency in markets to direct credit to
non-priority and import-intensive but more profitable
sectors, to concentrate investment funds in the hands
of a few large players and direct savings to already
well-developed centres of economic activity.
Finally, even in developing countries which choose a
mercantilist strategy of growth based on the rapid acquisition
of larger shares of segments of the world market for
manufactures, the government must ensure an adequate
flow of cheap credit to chosen firms. This needs to
be done so that they can make investments in frontline
technologies and internationally competitive scales
of production and would have the wherewithal to survive
during the long period when they build goodwill in the
market.
It is for these reasons that directed credit programmes
were and continue to be adopted by late industrialising
countries. This seems to be recognised by the draft
report, inasmuch as it surveys the experience with directed
credit of a select sample of countries such as China,
Japan and South Korea. However, the emphasis of the
survey is not the importance of directed credit in the
development of these countries, but on the problems
confronted in implementing directed credit programmes.
The ''findings'' of the survey are discouraging: risks
of default on priority lending are high; targeting results
in diversion of funds to non-priority purposes; differential
interest rates increase the cost of credit for non-preferred
borrowers and distort (rather than correct distorted)
incentive structures; and, once introduced, priority
lending is difficult to dispense with. Given this litany
of problems with directed credit, the working group's
case for continuing with priority sector lending appears
to be a contradiction. At best it appears to be the
better of two evils: iniquitous lending and distorting
interventionism in credit markets.
Fortunately, this has not prevented the working group
from recommending that the priority sector lending programme
should not just continue at the current level, but be
restructured. It calls for focus on direct and not indirect
lending to agriculture, for rendering mediated lending
to the small scale sector or lending for creation of
industrial estates is ineligible for priority status,
and for substantially reducing the width of ''other''
priority sectors by excluding areas like housing and
consumption loans and loans to SHGs/NGOs, the food and
agro-based processing sector and the software industry.
The recommendation to remove advances to SHGs/NGOs and
microfinance institutions from the priority category
is particularly significant. The enforced retreat of
the banks from rural credit provision under financial
liberalisation has been accompanied by an emphasis on
microcredit. But experience has shown that high transaction
costs make such credit extremely expensive and inadequate
to finance productive activity. But now, the pressure
to use the credit mechanism as an instrument of the
state is obviously strong enough for the working group
to recognise that microfinance is no substitute for
lending by the formal banking sector. Hopefully, these
conclusions and recommendations, and not the working
groups views on the experience with directed credit
worldwide, would be the basis for future policy.
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