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Lessons
from the US Sub-prime Lending Crisis |
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| Apr
18th 2007, C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh |
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A
noticeable feature of growth dynamics in contemporary
times is that investment and consumption spending by
households has been an important stimulus to growth.
Such spending, in turn, has been stimulated by changes
in the financial sector that have increased the volume
of credit, eased interest rates and made credit available
to individuals and firms that would have earlier been
considered inadequately creditworthy.
The last of these is of relevance, because it draws
into the market for housing and non-essential consumption
a set of consumers, who would not be present in these
markets if their spending was determined by their current
income. A credit boom expands the market for certain
assets and commodities at a much faster rate than is
possible if demand growth were dependent purely on either
income growth or on changes in income distribution.
Needless to say, income growth does matter in the medium
term, inasmuch as indebted households would have to
earn the incomes to meet the interest and amortisation
payments on their debt. If the requisite increases in
income do not materialise, defaults multiply and this
unwinds the boom. It would also have collateral effects
because it impacts on financial agents left with non-performing
debt and assets whose prices are falling because of
excess supplies of confiscated assets on sale.
The US is an economy that now is experiencing such a
downturn, the full consequences of which are still unclear.
The housing market in the US has been crucial to sustaining
growth in the US ever since the dotcom bust of 2000.
Galloping housing purchases stimulated residential investment
and rising housing asset values encouraged a consumption
splurge, keeping aggregate investment and consumption
growing.
As Chart 1, which provides the quarter-wise annual rate
of change in the combined US House Price Index shows,
the housing market began experiencing a boom in the
middle of 2003, which peaked in mid-2005. Though housing
prices have continued to rise since then, the annual
rate of inflation has consistently declined (Chart 2).
This in itself may be a much needed correction that
should be welcome.
But the downturn is giving cause for concern for two
reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, growth in the
US economy has been sustained by the boom in housing.
Rising house values increases the wealth of home owners
and has a wealth effect that encourages debt-financed
consumption. This drives demand and growth. The housing
boom also pushes up residential investment and construction
which through the demands it generates and the employment
it creates helps accelerate growth. As Chart 3 shows,
these features seem to have played a role during the
current housing cycle as well, though the effect is
more noticeable in the case of residential investment
than consumption, where other factors too must have
played a role.
The second problem lies in the way in which the boom
was triggered and kept going. Housing demand grew rapidly
because of easy access to credit, with even borrowers
with low creditworthiness scores, who would otherwise
be considered incapable of servicing debt, being drawn
into the credit net. These sub-prime borrowers were
offered credit at higher rates of interest, which were
sweetened by special treatment and unusual financing
arrangements-little documentation or mere selfcertification
of income, no or little down payment, extended repayment
periods and structured payment schedules involving low
interest rates in the initial phases which were "adjustable"
and move sharply upwards when they are "reset"
to reflect premia on market interest rates. All of these
encouraged or even tempted high-risk borrowers to take
on loans they could ill afford, either because they
had not fully understood the repayment burden they were
taking on or because they chose to conceal their actual
incomes and take a bet on building wealth with debt
in a market that was booming.
Chart
1 >>
The default risk which was almost inevitable in this
kind of lending, increased sharply when interest rates
rose. The net result has been an increase in defaults
and foreclosures. The Mortgage Bankers Association has
reportedly estimated aggregate housing loan default
at around 5 per cent of the total in the last quarter
of 2006, and defaults on high-risk sub-prime loans at
as much as 14.5 per cent. With a rise in so-called "delinquency
rates", foreclosed homes are now coming onto the
market for sale, threatening a situation of excess supply
that could turn decelerating house-price inflation into
a deflation or decline in prices. The prospect of such
a turn are strong given estimates by firms like Lehman
Brothers that mortgage defaults could total anywhere
between $225 billion and $300 billion during 2007 and
2008.
The first casualties in the crisis have been the mortgage
lenders, who used borrowed capital to finance mortgage
lending. Firms like New Century Financial, WMC Mortgage
and others, which made huge returns during the boom,
expanded lending volumes, encouraged by low interest
rates and slowing house price inflation in 2006. This
required moving into the sub-prime market to find new
borrowers. Estimates vary, but according to one by Inside
Mortgage Finance quoted by the New York Times, sub-prime
loans touched $600 billion in 2006 or 20 per cent of
the total as compared with just 5 per cent in 2001.
These mortgages reflected very little own equity of
the borrower. According to Bank of America Securities,
loans to sub-prime borrowers in 2001 covered on average
48 per cent of the value of the underlying property.
This had risen to 82 per cent by 2006. According to
the Financial Times, more than a third of sub-prime
loans in 2006 were for the full value of the property.
Chart
2 >>
Mortgage lenders or brokers were encouraged to
do this because they could easily sell their mortgages
to banks and the investment banks in Wall Street to
finance their activity and make a neat profit. And the
investment banks themselves were keen to buy into the
business because of the huge profits that could be made
by "securitising" these mortgages. Firms such
as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Morgan
Stanley, Deutsche Bank, UBS and others bought into mortgages,
pooled them, packaged them into securities and sold
them for huge fees and commissions. Numbers released
by the Bond Market Association indicate that mortgaged
backed securities issued in 2003 were at a peak in 2003
when they totalled $3 trillion. Even though total values
have declined since then because of the deceleration
in home price inflation, they are still close to the
$2 trillion mark. Among the investors in these collateralised
debt obligations (CDOs) are European pension fund and
Asian institutional investors.
Chart
3 >>
With high returns on creating these products
and facilitating trade in them, the investment banks
were hardly concerned with due diligence about the underlying
risk associated with these securities. That risk mattered
little to them since they were transferred to the purchasers
of those securities. The risks in the final analysis
are shared with pension funds and institutional investors
which were buying into these securities, looking for
high returns in an environment of low interest rates.
They are now experiencing a sharp fall in their asset
values and threatened with losses.
In fact the process of securitisation involves many
layers. To quote the Financial Times, the original mortgages
are "sold by specialist mortgage lenders on to
new investors, such as Wall Street banks, who then use
these to issue bonds which are often then repackaged
again as derivatives." According to that paper,
data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association indicate that more than $2 trillion of mortgage-backed
bonds were sold last year, of which about a quarter
were linked to sub-prime mortgages. In sum, this whole
process, which has at the bottom home owners faced with
foreclosure, is driven by layers of financial interests
looking for quick profits or high returns. This has
transformed the mortgage securities business. In earlier
times, these securities were bought by investors who
held them till the loans matured and earned their returns
over time. Now these are marked to market and traded.
They are also use to create complex derivatives which
too are marked to market and traded.
The net result is that the housing market crisis threatens
to build into a crisis of sorts in the US financial
sector, resulting in a liquidity crunch that can aggravate
the slowdown and precipitate a recession. All this has
occurred also because of the regulatory forbearance
that has characterised the ostensibly "transparent"
but actually opaque markets that are typical of modern
finance. Investment banks did not reveal the weak credit
base on which the mortgage securities business was built,
investment analysts routinely issued reports assuaging
fears of a meltdown, credit rating agencies did not
downgrade dicey bonds soon enough, and the market regulators
chose to look the other way when the speculative spiral
was built.
But now that the crisis has struck, fingers are being
pointed at others by every segment of the business.
The first fall-person has been the ostensibly deceitful
home owner. "Liar-loans" in which the borrower
does not truthfully declare incomes is blamed by the
business for its crisis. But it takes little to prevent
such activity, if lenders actually want to. The Mortgage
Asset Research Institute, found from an analysis of
100 loans involving self-declared incomes that documents
those borrowers had filed with the IRS showed that 60
per cent of them had inflated their incomes by more
than half. It doesn’t take much to demand an IRS return
when making a loan.
The investment banks are of course blaming the mortgage
lenders. Wall Street banks are filing suits to force
mortgage lenders to repurchase loans which they claim
were sold to them based on misleading information. If
a Wall Street bank can be tricked, they don’t have the
right to advise investors where to put their money.
And reports have it that those who bought into the bonds
and derivatives these banks peddled are planning to
move court accusing these Wall Street firms of failures
of due diligence.
Finally, the regulators and Congress are sitting up,
as they did after the crash of the late 1990s which
led to the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. US Congressmen
are threatening to frame a law that restricts the freedoms
investment banks and other financial entities have when
creating bonds and derivatives by repackaging mortgages
to sell them to investors around the world.
But all this is to wake up after the event has transpired.
The "efficient" American financial system
is clearly not geared to preventing a crisis, even if
it proves capable of finding a solution. A solution
that prevents the sub-prime crisis from overwhelming
the mortgage business as a whole, by triggering a collapse
in house prices, is imperative given the importance
of the housing boom in keeping the American economy
going. A slowdown in growth may be manageable. But a
recession can send ripples across the globe.
All this has lessons for countries like India. First,
they should be cautious about resorting to financial
liberalisation that is reshaping their domestic financial
structures in the image of that in the US. That structure
is prone to crisis, as the dotcom bust and the current
crisis illustrates. Second, they should refrain from
over-investing in the doubtful securities that proliferate
in the US. Third, they should opt out of high growth
trajectories driven by debt-financed consumption and
housing spending, since these inevitably involve bringing
risky borrowers into the lending and splurging net.
Finally, they should beware of international financial
institutions and their domestic imitators, who are importing
unsavoury financial practices into the domestic financial
sector. The problem, however, is that they may have
already gone too far with processes of financial restructuring
that have increased fragility on all these counts.
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