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Implementing
the NREGS |
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| Sep
24th 2008, C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh |
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The
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act has now been
in operation for more than two years, even though
it is still being extended to all the rural areas
of the country. In that relatively short time, it
has already become one of the most avidly studied
programmes of the central government, with many independent
evaluations in different states as well as government
audit of its performance thus far.
It is increasingly recognised that the NREGA has the
potential not only to generate more employment directly
and indirectly, but also to transform rural economic
and social relations at many levels. But there is
also no doubt that this enormous potential is still
incipient and requires to be substantially supported
in many different ways. This is because the way that
the NREGA has been framed, and the desired mode of
implementation, amount to no less than asking for
a social and political revolution. The programme reverses
the way the Indian state has traditionally dealt with
the citizenry, and envisages a complete change in
the manner of interaction of the state, the local
power elites and the local working classes in rural
India.
Thus, the NREGA is completely different in conception
from earlier government employment schemes that tended
to be in the form of paternalistic provision, since
it treats employment as a right and the programme
is intended to be demand-driven. Furthermore, the
Act and Guidelines anticipate very substantial participation
of the local people in the planning and monitoring
of the specific schemes, to a degree which has not
been at all common.
The very notion of employment as a right of citizens
(even if it is limited to 100 days per household in
the Act); of the obligation of the government to meet
the demand for work within a specified time period,
and to have developed a shelf of public works that
can be drawn upon to meet this demand; of the panchayat
participation in planning and monitoring; and the
provision for social audit, are all very new concepts.
For this to work, it requires, at the minimum, two
things: the ability and willingness of local government
and panchayats to plan works and run the programme
effectively; and the dissemination about the programme
and its guidelines to local people who can make use
of it to register, demand work and run social audits.
Obviously, all this will take time to permeate down
to the local levels. So to start with, an uneven record
of implementation is only to be expected. So is the
presence of a large number of problems that require
correction. There are bound to be difficulties and
time lags in making local officials and others responsive
to this very different approach.
And of course, both this different rights-based approach
and the implications of the programme in improving
the bargaining power of rural workers would necessarily
challenge the prevailing power structures, in some
cases quite substantially. Therefore attempts to oppose
or subvert the correct and full implementation of
the scheme in rural areas are only to be expected.
It is increasingly clear that effective implementation
of the NREGS requires at least the following conditions:
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The capacity (including technical and administrative
capacity) and willingness of local government
and panchayats to plan works and run the programme
effectively.
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Dissemination about the programme and its guidelines
to local people who can make use of it to register
and demand work
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Mobilisation
to create ability to run social audits without
fear of repression.
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The willingness of local authorities to respond
to problems and criticisms, and to change their
behaviour accordingly, as well as effective redressal
mechanisms for those whose rights have not been
met.
Of course, the programme is still very young, and
is only just being started in many districts. Chart
1 shows that there has been significant expansion
of the official coverage of the NREGS in several states
in the current year, including Gujarat, Karnataka,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.
Chart
1 >>
However, as field reports have shown, the mere
expansion to more districts often does not actually
mean that the scheme is implemented on the ground,
as the local officialdom may not be prepared to take
it on or to fulfil all the conditions of transparency
and accountability that are stated in the Act.
Table
1 provides a summary of the official evidence on implementation,
based on the data from the NREGA website. It calculates
the proportion of households that have received job
cards or employment by estimating total rural households
in each state (dividing the projections of rural population
from the Census of India with the average household
size estimated by the NSSO).
Table
1 >>
It is immediately clear that even based on
the official data there are very wide regional variations
in implementation. In fact, there are also big intra-state
variations, across districts and even blocks, which
cannot be captured here.
As
Table 1 shows, most states have improved on the provision
of job cards in the past two years, and in some states
such as Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand, Rajasthan,
Orissa and West Bengal, a majority of rural households
have received job cards. An extreme case is Madhya
Pradesh, where the number of job cards issued exceeds
the estimated number of rural households! However,
the northern states of Punjab, Haryana and to a lesser
extent Uttar Pradesh are clearly lagging behind even
in the distribution of job cards.
However, the percentage of households that have received
some work under the scheme is significantly lower.
Only in Chhattisgarh in 2007-08 and in Rajasthan in
the current year, has it crossed half of estimated
rural households. In most states the gap between job
card distribution and actual provision of employment
remains huge. Even in MP, where more job cards have
been distributed that number of households, only 35
per cent of rural households actually received some
employment under the scheme. Another surprise is Maharashtra,
where the proportion of households that has received
work remains abysmally low despite the state’s earlier
experience of employment guarantee scheme.
This has been possible despite the provisions of the
Act, because most states collapsed the distinction
between demanding and receiving work, which is a major
aspect designed to ensure the accountability of government.
As Table 2 shows, the gap between the number of households
that demanded work and those that received it is very
small, often zero, suggesting that either workers
are not made aware that they need to separately demand
work or that states and local authorities are simply
allowing workers to fill in their demand for work
when the work is already being provided. This is a
major lacuna that needs to be addressed.
Table
2 >>
Despite this and several other gaps, there is already
some evidence of success. Field reports suggest that
there has been some improvement in consumption of
the poor, reduction of distress migration and slight
increases in lean season wage rates (especially for
women) in the areas where the programme has functioned
successfully.
Also,
the NREGS has led to the disproportionate involvement
of women workers, far above expectation. As Chart
2 shows, in Kerala women account for as much as 85
per cent of the total employment under the scheme.
This proportion is also high in the other southern
states and in Rajasthan. While the other southern
states have had high rural work force participation
of women already, Kerala and Rajasthan had had very
low rates, so this greater involvement of women in
the NREGS must also be leading to social changes.
Chart
2>>
Similarly, Charts 3 and 4 show significantly
higher participation of SCs and STs than their shares
of rural population in many states. While this may
reflect the fact that they are also more likely to
be represented among rural workers, even so it is
a sign that the NREGS has succeeeded in targeting
the more socially disadvantaged sections.
Chart
3>> Chart
4>>
Obviously, these successes have to be sustained,
replicated and expanded. And in other areas the weaknesses
of the programme that have been identified by many
observers have to be addressed, including through
local mobilisation. But this cannot happen overnight
- it is necessarily a long process. The important
thing is to create a socio-political momentum whereby
the programme will actually work as intended across
the country.
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