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Growth
Rates under the NDA Government
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Mar
15th 2004, Jayati Ghosh and C.P. Chandrasekhar
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The
economic performance of the NDA government since it
came to power is an issue fraught with controversy.
The spin doctors of the BJP, the major party on the
currently ruling coalition, have decided that high economic
growth is a major achievement of the NDA, and this has
been emphasised in the electoral campaign thus far.
But
even the growth performance claimed by the current government
has been contested by critics, who claim that the most
recent claims made, of more than 8 per cent growth in
the current year, are because of the low economic activity
in the previous year due to the drought and its effects
on agricultural production. In this context, it is worth
examining the growth patterns of the previous years
in more detail.
It seems premature and possibly irresponsible to base
economic arguments on any estimates for the current
year, which after all is still continuing, and for which
any projections are likely to be subject to very major
revisions. Therefore, we conduct an exercise based on
data up to 2002-03, for which reasonably reliable official
series exist.
In
order to assess the performance of the NDA government
in terms of various economic growth indicators, we look
at two periods: the six-year period preceding 1 April
1998, and the six-year period after 1 April 1998. For
convenience, we will refer to these as Period 1 and
Period 2. This allows us to assess the performance of
the NDA government (Period 2) compared to its immediate
predecessors in the form of the United Front and Congress-led
governments (Period 1).
Chart
1 >>
Chart 1 indicates the trend rate of growth of GDP (at
both factor cost and market prices) over the two periods.
However, since some analysts may find the trend rate
problematic given that the periods under consideration
are each only of six years duration, Chart 2 provides
the compound rates of growth for the same periods, based
on the initial and end years.
Chart
2 >>
It is obvious that by both measures, growth of national
income decelerated quite substantially in Period 2,
that is, under the NDA government. In fact, the period
from April 1998 until March 2003 appears to have experienced
a deceleration of growth compared to the earlier fifteen
year period as well.
Of course, it could be argued that the aggregate growth
estimates are affected by the poor performance of the
economy in 2002-03 because of the bad monsoon which
adversely affected agricultural production. This is
certainly very evident in Charts 3 and 4, which show
the trend and compound rates of growth of production
of all crops and of foodgrains in particular.
Chart
3 >> Chart
4 >>
Growth of agricultural production was actually negative
during this period, mainly because of the drought-induced
collapse in production in the last year. Indeed, the
apparently fabulous recovery of the current year, which
has been cited so much in government and ruling party
handouts, is essentially nothing more than the reflection
of the recovery of agriculture consequent upon a very
good monsoon.
This brings home the unfortunate reality that the Indian
economy is still heavily dependent upon the monsoon,
which can still create major changes not only in agricultural
output but also in aggregate economic activity. This
is despite the much increased external openness of the
economy, which has now been exposed to international
trade and capital flows more than ever before. It also
undoes some of the claims made by the votaries of such
policies, that economic liberalisation had unleashed
such animal spirits in the economy that agriculture
was no longer of macroeconomic significance and that
the growth impetus of the economy is no longer affected
by it.
Even in industrial production, the slowdown of the second
period is very marked. Chart 5 indicates a sharp deceleration
of the index of industrial production, by both trend
and compound rates of growth. This cannot be blamed
on the last year alone; the entire six-year period indicated
sluggish expansion of industrial output.
Chart
5 >>
Why has this happened? Some clues can be gleaned from
the pattern of aggregate investment, described in Chart
6 in terms of the rates of growth of real gross domestic
capital formation. Such investment increased at a reasonable
rate in the earlier period, above 9 per cent per annum
in real terms. However, in the second period (the tenure
of the NDA regime) the increase in investment had slumped
to only around 5 per cent per annum.
Chart
6 >>
Even this low rate of increase is of dubious significance,
since both public and private corporate investment stagnated
or even declined over this latter period. Indeed, such
increase as did occur in capital formation after 1998
came about mainly because of household sector capital
formation. This is determined in the national accounts
as a residual, and essentially reflects increases in
domestic construction activity.
Investment declined because public investment has stagnated
or declined under the NDA regime. Despite the recent
promises of national highway expansion and other such
indicators of material prosperity, the NDA government
has spent less (in real per capita terms) on productive
investment for infrastructure and economic growth, than
any government in independent India.
It is well known that in India, as in almost all other
developing countries, there are strong positive linkages
between public and private investment. Typically, high
rates of public investment call forth and enable more
private investment activity.
However, the policy makers of the NDA appeared to believe
that they could further reduce the amount of productive
public expenditure and expect private entrepreneurs
to take up the slack and increase aggregate investment.
Obviously, this was not likely to happen in the absence
of any other major positive stimulus. So it is not surprising
that the NDA's tenure has been associated with lower
rates of growth of industrial production and economic
activity generally, than the preceding period.
This is not to deny the rapid growth that has definitely
occurred in certain sectors in this period, such as
telecom and IT-enabled services. However, these sectors
are still extremely small, and their admittedly extraordinary
growth (reflecting the effects of rapid worldwide technological
change as well) has occurred over very low bases. Further,
such growth as has occurred has not been enough to counteract
the effects of deceleration, stagnation or even decline
in the larger, more important industries and in agriculture
and many other services.
Indeed, the bulk of economic activity over this period
did not show much acceleration, certainly when compared
to the earlier period. This is in conformity with other
indicators such as employment generation, especially
in the organised sectors, which also indicate stagnation
or insufficient expansion.
These basic arguments are not changed even if the most
current year's data are included. For example, consider
the effects of incorporating the projected GDP growth
of 8.4 per cent in 2003-04 (which is what the CSO's
advance estimates suggest). Even this gives a compound
rate of growth of real GDP at market prices of 5.8 per
cent per annum in the period from April 1998, compared
to 6.3 per cent in the earlier period. The trend rate
of growth is also lower than in the previous period,
even if the current year's high estimate is included.
However, it is worth reiterating that using the current
year's estimates is extremely problematic, since such
advance estimates are typically revised quite drastically
and therefore can be quite misleading.
So the official figures suggest that whatever else may
be the NDA's strengths, successful macroeconomic management
is not among them. This is evident in the slack that
remains in the economy in the form of high unemployment
and underemployment, wasteful build-up of reserves through
allowing unnecessary capital inflows that are not being
productively used, and of course through the appalling
waste of public food stocks that were exported away
at below BPL prices when hundreds of millions within
the country remained hungry. But it is even apparent
in the aggregate growth performance, which unfortunately
has not been anywhere near as impressive as the current
government's propaganda would have us believe.
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