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| The
Industrial Upturn |
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| Nov
5th 2007, C.P. Chandrasekhar |
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With
the Sensex defying all laws of economic gravity, the
disconnect between India’s booming financial sector
and its real economy has only worsened. Few would argue
that the performance of the real economy can explain
the recent exuberance in the stock markets. So, this
may be a good time to look to the real economy to introduce
an element of moderation into assessments of economic
performance.
It hardly bears repeating that going by GDP estimates
(that are still subject to revision) the Indian economy
has moved on to a higher growth trajectory over the
last four years with growth averaging over 8 per cent
per annum. But what has been more welcome is the evidence
that high growth is no longer confined only to services,
but characterizes the manufacturing sector as well.
While agriculture still performs poorly, there appears
to be at least one segment of the commodity producing
economy that has begun to reflect the dynamism that
services have displayed thus far. And this trend is
continuing.
On October 12, the Central Statistical Organization
(CSO) released the provisional Index of Industrial Production
(IIP with 1999-2000 base) for the month of August. This
gave some cause to celebrate. Not only was the annual
month-to-month rate of growth of the IIP (at 10.7 per
cent) marginally better than it was a year earlier,
but it appears to have recovered from a downturn in
June and July this year, when industrial growth lost
some of its momentum and fell to 7.5 per cent. These
signs of the persistence of high industrial and manufacturing
growth are reassuring, since past experience under liberalization
suggests that high industrial growth has not been the
rule and periods of high growth have been short-lived.
Taking a long view, we find that industrial growth as
captured by the IIP, which averaged 9 per cent in the
second half of the 1980s, slumped immediately after
the balance of payments crisis of 1991. However, a recovery
followed, with manufacturing growth rising to a peak
of 14.1 per cent over the three-year period 1993-94
to 1995-96. This led many to argue that liberalization
had begun to deliver in terms of industrial growth.
But the boom proved short-lived, and industry entered
a relatively long period of much slower growth, with
fears of an industrial recession being expressed by
2001-02.
Since then the industrial sector has once again recovered,
with rates of growth touching the high level s of the
mid-1990s by 2004-05. Even though the peak of 1995-96
has not been equaled, growth has been creditable and
sustained for more than three years now. But given the
mid-1990s experience every sign of a possible downturn,
as that in July this year, is received with some apprehension.
Chart
1 >>
One
cause for comfort is that there are significant differences
between the mini-boom of the mid-1990s and what is occurring
now. As has been argued before in this column, the 1993-1995
“mini-boom” was the result of a combination of several
once-for-all influences. Principal among these was the
release after liberalization of the pent-up demand for
a host of import-intensive manufactures, which (because
of liberalization) could be serviced through domestic
assembly or production using imported inputs and components.
Once that demand had been satisfied, further growth
had to be based on an expansion of the domestic market
or a surge in exports. Since neither of these conditions
was realized, industry entered a phase of slow growth.
What was surprising, in fact, was that growth was not
even lower. Economic liberalization and fiscal reform
were bound to adversely affect manufacturing growth.
To start with, import liberalization resulted in some
displacement of existing domestic production directly
by imports and indirectly by new products assembled
domestically from imported inputs. Second, the reduction
in customs duties resorted to as part of the import
liberalization package and the direct and indirect tax
concessions that were provided to the private sector
to stimulate investment, led to a decline in the tax-GDP
ratio at the Centre by anywhere between 1.5 to 2 percentage
points of GDP. This implied that so long as deficit-spending
by the government did not increase, the demand stimulus
associated with government expenditure would be lower
than would have otherwise been the case. Third, after
1993-94 the government also chose to significantly curtail
the fiscal deficit as part of fiscal reform, so that
the stimulus provided to industrial growth by state
expenditure was substantially smaller than was the case
in the 1980s.
Chart
2>>
If
all this did not result in an even steeper decline in
industrial growth it was partly because increases in
consumer credit facilitated by financial liberalization
kept the demand for consumption goods at above average
levels in many years. Further, the ‘windfall gains’
registered by a significant number of central and state
government employees as a result of the payment of arrears
following of the implementation of the Fifth Pay Commission’s
recommendations also contributed to an increase in the
number having the wherewithal to contribute to such
demand.
Compared with that experience there are elements of
both continuity and change in the more recent boom in
manufacturing. The element of continuity stems from
the extremely important role that credit-financed consumption
and investment play in keeping industrial demand at
high levels. Credit has been an important stimulus to
industrial demand in three areas. First, it has financed
a boom in investment in housing and real estate and
spurred the growth in demand for construction materials.
Second, it has financed purchases of automobiles and
triggered an automobile boom. Finally it has contributed
to the expansion in demand for consumer durables.
The point to note is that compared to the mid-1990s
the growth of credit has been explosive, facilitated
in part by the liquidity injected into the system by
the large inflows of foreign financial capital in the
form of equity and debt. In the wake of this increase
in liquidity, expansion in credit provision has been
accompanied by an increase in the exposure of the banking
sector to the retail loan segment. The share of personal
loans in total bank credit has almost doubled in recent
years rising from 12.2 per cent in 2001 to 22.2 per
cent in 2005. Much of this has been concentrated in
housing finance, with housing loans accounting for 53
per cent of retail loans in 2005. But purchasers of
automobiles and consumer durables have also received
a fair share of credit. The importance of credit-financed
private consumption and investment for growth has been
flagged in recent times by the Finance Ministry. Despite
being an ardent votary of financial liberalization and
being committed to a policy of minimal government intervention,
it has chosen to hector public sector banks into reducing
interest rates every time there is any sign of a slowing
of credit growth. It is not non-intervention that the
new breed of liberalization involves, but a form of
intervention that uses the financial sector as means
of stimulating the demand needed to keep private sector
growth going.
The element of change in the factors contributing to
industrial growth during the current boom as opposed
to that in the mid-1990s is the stimulus provided by
exports. In the early and mid-1990s high growth was
accompanied by high imports, with exports growing, if
at all, in areas where India was traditionally strong.
In recent years, the share of India’s traditional manufactured
exports such as textiles, gems and jewelry and leather
in the total exports of manufactures has declined, while
that of chemicals and engineering goods has gone up
significantly. This would have stimulated growth. While
exports are by no means the principal drivers of manufacturing
production, they play a part in sectors like automobile
parts and chemicals and pharmaceuticals where Indian
firms are increasingly successful in global markets.
All this suggests that Indian industry has been experiencing
a transition. While during the first four decades of
development industrial growth was almost solely dependent
on the stimulus offered by government expenditure and
the support provided by public investment in infrastructure,
there are signs that other sources of demand such as
private consumption demand and exports are playing an
important role in recent times. Further, the current
industrial buoyancy suggests that these new stimuli
have, unlike during much of the 1990s, neutralized the
adverse effects that import liberalization and fiscal
contraction had on industrial growth. But with just
three years of high growth so far, the question remains
whether this is a sustainable trajectory or merely another
mini-boom awaiting its inevitable end.
The latter is a possibility if the growth in credit-financed
consumption or in exports is tenuous. To the extent
that the expansion in credit is dependent on the liquidity
generated by inflows of foreign capital, sustaining
the process requires the persistence of such inflows.
In the past a surge in capital flows has inevitably
been followed by a reversal, making this a real possibility.
Moreover, credit expansion has resulted in excess exposure
of Indian banks to the housing and real estate sector,
forcing the Reserve Bank of India to issue periodic
warnings. Defaults resulting from such exposure would
not only freeze credit flow, but could adversely affect
investor confidence resulting in an exit of foreign
investors.
Exports too are under threat because of the effect that
the surge in capital flows is having on the value of
the rupee. Exporters have been complaining for long
that rupee appreciation driven by capital inflows is
undermining their competitiveness making it most unlikely
that they would meet targets. But unwilling to limit
or curb capital inflows, the government has offered
to compensate them in other ways to neutralize the effects
of the appreciation. If it is not successful in this
effort the export stimulus may weaken too.
In sum, while there are important differences between
the mid-1990s industrial mini-boom and the boom that
is currently underway, which make this episode of growth
robust, the danger of a downturn still lurks. This is
a challenge the government must face up to. That, however,
may require shifting from credit to state expenditure
as a stimulus to growth and limiting capital flows to
stabilize the rupee. |
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